RFC-BGT-AUTHOR: Author's Note

This note accompanies the Bitcoin Game Theory framework and its academic papers. It discloses authorship, states the author's moral position, clarifies the relationship between the author's views and the framework's conclusions, and addresses the settlement-acceptance distinction that bears on the moral dimension of neutral money.

"Sean Hash" is a pen name. The author is a single human individual writing under a pseudonym, following the tradition of pseudonymous contributions in cryptography and monetary theory. The choice is practical, not evasive: pseudonymity routes attention to the derivation chain rather than the author's biography, credentials, or institutional affiliations.

The framework is designed to be evaluated on its logical structure. Every claim derives from four empirical axioms (AX1-AX4). Every claim specifies falsification conditions. The author's identity is irrelevant to whether the axioms hold and whether the derivations are valid.

The Bitcoin Game Theory Foundation (BGTF) provides organizational backing for this research.

The author acknowledges modest priors that inform this work:

1. A multipolar world is preferable to a world governed by a single power.

2. Individual economic sovereignty is preferable to total state control of capital.

These are not exotic positions. They are broadly shared across democratic traditions and international relations theory. They do not predetermine the framework's conclusions -- the game-theoretic derivation works for purely selfish actors regardless of values. An actor who rejects both priors still faces the same exit game and the same payoff structure.

The author also acknowledges a real moral cost: a neutral settlement layer will process transactions for actors whose purposes are harmful. North Korean hackers, sanctions evaders, and human traffickers can settle on Bitcoin. This is not a hypothetical concern; it is an observed fact.

The author's position: this cost is real, but it does not change the game-theoretic equilibrium. Settlement is not acceptance (see Section 3). And the alternative -- a settlement layer controlled by a trusted authority -- presupposes a trusted authority, which presupposes the closed world (W2) that multipolarity empirically rejects.

The amoral game theory proof does not depend on the author sharing these priors. It depends on the axioms. Evaluate the derivation chain, not the author.

A common moral objection: "If Bitcoin settles for criminals, doesn't that make Bitcoin complicit?" This conflates two distinct concepts.

Settlement is a protocol-layer fact. A valid cryptographic signature transfers value. The Bitcoin protocol does not evaluate identity, purpose, or legality. Property P3 (Permissionless) guarantees this.

Acceptance is an application-layer decision. Any counterparty -- exchange, merchant, institution, or autonomous agent -- may refuse specific UTXOs based on provenance analysis, sanctions screening, or bilateral policy. Acceptance is discretionary.

This distinction creates a natural enforcement equilibrium without requiring protocol-level censorship:

1. Regulated entities (exchanges, custodians) must filter by law. They control the fiat on/off ramps.

2. Tainted coins that cannot convert to fiat at par have diminished economic utility -- a "provenance discount."

3. The provenance discount disincentivizes the crime that creates tainted coins. You can steal Bitcoin, but you cannot easily spend it at full value.

4. Detection probability increases over time. Unlike cash, Bitcoin's permanent ledger means chain analysis improves retroactively. Coins accepted today may be flagged tomorrow.

5. None of this requires changing the protocol. Enforcement emerges from rational acceptance decisions at the application layer.

The game theory of acceptance:

An actor receiving coins of uncertain provenance faces:

E[Accept] = V - (p * d * c)

where: V = value of coins p = probability coins are tainted d = probability of detection (increasing over time) c = cost of punishment if detected

Accept is rational when V > p * d * c. But d is not fixed -- it increases monotonically as chain analysis improves. This means the expected cost of accepting tainted coins rises over time, even retroactively. Rational actors develop provenance analysis before accepting, especially actors for whom analysis cost approaches zero (institutions, AI agents).

For autonomous agents specifically: analysis cost is near zero (on-chain data is machine-readable), so agents converge on near- perfect provenance filtering -- not from morality but from rational risk management.

The result: Bitcoin provides neutral settlement (protocol layer) while the ecosystem produces its own enforcement through rational acceptance decisions (application layer). These are compatible, not contradictory. The moral objection resolves within the framework.

See [BGT-0001] E5, [BGT-PAPER-2] Section 5.4.

The framework is descriptive, not prescriptive. It explains what rational actors do, not what they should do.

The game-theoretic proof works for actors who: - Hold any political ideology - Have any moral framework - Want Bitcoin to fail - Want Bitcoin to succeed - Are indifferent to Bitcoin entirely

The exit game payoff structure does not depend on beliefs about Bitcoin. It depends on the axioms (AX1-AX4). If you accept multipolarity, rational self-interest, computational hardness, and network effect persistence, the conclusions follow mechanically.

If this thesis is wrong, demonstrate which axiom fails.